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ЯК РОСІЙСЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКА ВІЙНА ЗМІНИЛА ГЕОПОЛІТИЧНУ КАРТИНУ СВІТУ

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HOW THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR CHANGED THE GEOPOLITICAL PICTURE OF THE WORLD

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Abstract. *For centuries, Russia was the country that was showing its power in the international political system. Firstly, the emergence of the Soviet Union and 15 countries united under one roof, and then its dissolution in 1991 made Russia a more aggressive power that the international community witnessed these years. This was mainly against the post-Soviet Space, as Russia till today, thinks that post-Soviet countries are and should be under the influence of Russia. That's the main reason why Russia has aggressive foreign policy towards its neighboring countries, especially Georgia and Ukraine. The wars against Ukraine and Georgia show how huge a threat can be coming from the imperialist neighbor state. Here, three main years of wars are outlined: 2008, 2014, and the year of 2022, when Russia started a new military occupation against Ukraine. This aggressive foreign policy dimension is not only a threat for only post-Soviet space but to international security as well. Russia's internal and external policy dimensions have always been a subject of international world order, as its steps always had some implications for both regional and international political systems. This research will discuss what are the main implications of military occupations conducted by Russia in the 21st century.*

Keywords: *Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, military aggression, occupation, geopolitics.*

Introduction

Russia has always been an aggressive state towards its neighboring countries. From the year of 2008, it started active military occupation firstly from Georgia, and then in 2014 and this year, towards Ukraine. Quite simply, with this aggressive foreign policy coming from Russia, other post-Soviet states are also under threat from Russia. The important question here is what is the root cause for these military occupations conducted by Russia. In understanding this, a quick review of the historical record will be useful which is discussed in the next paragraph.

In the 20th century, international society has witnessed three devastating wars. 1st and 2nd world wars and then the Cold War (Lukacs, 2013). In these mentioned three wars, Russia has always been actively participating. During the Cold War, Russia, under the name of the Soviet Union was against the United States. The Cold War had huge implications: the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a unipolar world with the U.S. as a superpower, and 15 newly independent post-Soviet states. After this historical record, quite simply, Russia has always been a threat to both regional and international security.

The main goal of international political system in the 21st century was to keep peace and security throughout the world, (Stolberg, 2012) but Russia's imperialism politics have changed everything. 2008, 2014 and 2022 are the years of military occupations by Russia against Georgia and Ukraine. These wars have changed regional and international security. It had and still has huge impact of international society and its implications can be seen in every aspect of Georgia, Ukraine's and world political stability and system.

Moscow's more fundamental concern about Kyiv is that for most of Ukraine's independence period (since 1991), Kyiv's former administration made Russian officials satisfied and it was not threatening Russia and its interests towards Ukraine. It changed in the year of 2014, in case of only in the context of Russia's perception of excessive interference by the United States and Europe in Ukraine's internal affairs (Mary Wood, 2022).

This is the beginning of everything that took place after that. What Russia wants is simple, to recover the status-quo in 2014 and want Ukrainian people to do it themselves as much as possible. They do not want to impose government by conquest. They want to convince the Ukrainian people they don't have any other option. (Mary Wood, 2022)

The second goal of Russia is as follows: creating some type of discord with the Europe, between the United States and Europe. As the last goal from three options, we can consider confusing the superpower state, the United States and make it appear ineffective (Wood, 2022).

The concept of international security constitutes a system of views in ensuring security starting from individuals till the globe (Williams, 2008) Russia is one of the huge country around the world within a huge history, it continues playing a huge role in international political and security system. Especially while speaking about its economic, research-technical and military potential taken with unique situation in the Eurasian continent. Russia's military occupations in the 21st century have become the biggest threat for international security (Civil.ge, 2022). That's the main reason why

some states, especially Western powers, have been trying to weaken russia's position in every aspect of international relations.

A new report by the European Council on Foreign Relations, based on a European-wide poll, suggests that the farewell to russia is irreversible, at least in the short and medium term. The majority of Europeans have lost all illusions about russia's integration into the world. Many support the severance of economic, cultural and even diplomatic relations with russia. Western sanctions have not changed Russia's foreign policy, but the European government has been forced to abandon the idea that moscow could be a credible partner for the West (Krastev, 2022).

In terms of soft power, the Ukrainian invasion has achieved two things. It is the decisive end of the remaining post-soviet identity and the contempt that moscow used the soviet victory over Hitler as part of the national myth and international reputation (Krastev, 2022).

The military occupations in Georgia and Ukraine done by russia shows differences, but it also outlines similarities. The two conflicts are not similar in all respects, and all of these conflicts have their own history, dynamics and rationale, but the experience gained in one conflict is particularly geopolitical. The same is true for stands that can affect a country's geopolitical behavior in other conflicts if it is at stake. Looking back after the conflict between Syria and Ukraine began, russia's response in Georgia is better understood because of the similarities between russia's tactics and actions in all these conflicts. Strategic geopolitical realities suggest that they are independent of each other, but the motive behind russia's intervention stems from similar security and spatial strategic interests (Crisisgroup, 2022).

Implications of russian Military Occupation for International Security

The 21st century became really challenging for western society. russian military occupation, although in different region, directly challenges the international security order established by Western democratic societies, especially after the Second World War and with the formation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Western societies main aim was to weaken and later, to end the Soviet Union in the year of 1991 (Phil Ciciora, 2022).

In essence, russian president vladimir putin is demanding a table seat in determining European security on par with Western democracy. Based on putin's own statement, he calls for the dissolution of NATO and the EU to promote russia's security and economic interests. In the attack on Ukraine, he bet that the West would not react to russia's invasion of non-NATO countries. The West has been predominantly since the invasion of the Republic of Georgia in 2008, and the Donbus region of Ukraine resisted reacting to russia's invasion abroad in 2014, Crimea was readmitted to russia. (Phil Ciciora, 2022).

russian Military Occupations and their Implication on the International Political System

Speaking about international security system and what implications russian 21st century's aggression has, its important to analyze different aspects of it. In this chapter, we are going to speak implications of russian wars in four main aspects:

climate change, nuclear war, economic situation, and independence of other states that are under threat during russo-Ukrainian war.

Climate change is one of the most important subject and thread for international security. But how does russian wars against Ukraine affect it? Quite simple, warfare and military activities are directly related to climate change because they utilize vast amounts of fossil fuels to power their machinery and weapons, and armies are among the world's top producers of carbon. The changes has worsened after the war. For example, we can suggest IPCC's, or Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change research that stresses on how complicated is our current situation. Especially they were speaking about anthropogenic, which is the disasters caused by human beings (Sam Meredith, 2022).

As already mentioned, one of the effects of russia's ongoing war on Ukraine is related to the nuclear threat to its population. Russia captured the scene of the Chernobyl accident from the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine by russian military forces. Many say that this is a deliberate maneuver to allow Russian soldiers to bypass Kyiv via Belarus, sending a message to the West that the takeover of Chernobyl should not interfere. Some argue that you should send. Some of officials believe that it had historical significance, as many believe that the Chernobyl incident led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. (RadioLibery, 2022).

If the nuclear waste stored in Chernobyl is not contained and treated carefully, it can cause irreversible damage to not only environment, but also the people around it for decades. Recently, there were reports of a Russian attack on the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant in Ukraine. This caused 10 times more fire than Chernobyl and exacerbated the risk of disaster. The details including in this report are not yet clear, but we know that Russia intends to capture it and at least disrupt Ukraine's energy sources. Ukraine's electricity is generated by nuclear power, and this facility provides 20% of the country's energy. At best, this was a geopolitical act by Russia, but if Putin was involved for the nuclear power plant assault, how much resistance he would show to use the nuclear weapons if he felt compelled to do so. Some even suggest that it may be. (RadioLibery, 2022).

On one side of the dispute, russian people are enduring severe economic hardship as a result of sanctions imposed by governments throughout the world (Evgeny Gontmakher, 2022). The European Union, Australia, Japan, and even the famously neutral Switzerland were among those who imposed sanctions on russia. The European Union promised to have "maximum impact" on russia's economy, while some countries, such as Japan and Australia, chose to sanction the oligarchs and their luxury goods, and US sanctions included a freeze on putin's assets. (UAB Institute for Human Rights Blog, 2022)

russia's military occupation against Ukraine definitely created not only human suffering and humanitarian crisis, but also it is simply damaging economic situation, mainly global trade. Low-income countries and less developed ones will be damaged by this in most of the cases. World Trade Organization is already warns the society about this threat by suggesting that prospects for economy have darkened after the war has started. Economists from WTO has analyzed merchandise trade volumes in

exporting and importing goods, which has witnessed downgrade from 4.7 % to almost 3 % which can be considered as one of the huge impact for global economy. (Victoria Masterson, 2022).

The remarkably fast reaction to russia's invasion is likewise constant with a realist expertise of alliance politics. Shared values could make alliances greater cohesive and enduring, however severe commitments to collective protection end result ordinarily from perceptions of a not unusual place danger. The stage of danger, in turn, is a characteristic of power, proximity, and foe with offensive talents and competitive intentions. These factors pass an extended manner to explaining why the Soviet Union confronted sturdy balancing coalitions in Europe and Asia at some stage in the Cold War: It had a big business economy, its empire bordered many different countries, its navy forces have been big and designed ordinarily for offensive operations, and it seemed to have rather revisionist ambitions. Today, russia's moves have dramatically multiplied perceptions of danger within side the West, and the end result has been a show of balancing conduct that few could have anticipated only a few brief weeks ago. (Stephen M. Walt, 2022)

The big problem is the possibility of nuclear expansion in the military conflict between the Western Allies and russia. There are a few nuclear powers in the United States, russia, the United Kingdom and France. This threat is real, not small. Putin's invasion automatically raises the precursors to the security threats facing the West and pushes them across the Ukrainian border. By threatening the use of nuclear weapons, Putin foretold a change in the ocean that states are likely to see the use of nuclear weapons. There is no option to throw lightly on the table. (Phil Ciciora, 2022)

Using nuclear force by russia has become a threat to the globe. Putin's threat to use nuclear weapons had two implications. First, it has historically changed the nature of the dialogue on the use of nuclear weapons because russia has effectively declared that it can use nuclear weapons in the offensive way it has chosen against Ukraine and other NATO members. Second, no one knows the consequences of putin's use of nuclear weapons. That is because it puts the Western allies in a one-on-one situation. A small nuclear weapon of only 18 kilotons destroyed Hiroshima. What if putin unleashes a weapon that is many times larger in Ukraine? This is truly an apocalyptic scenario brought to the fore by putin, threatening Western civilization and human life in general on Earth. (Phil Ciciora, 2022)

The Factors Affecting russia's Political Interest Towards Ukraine and Georgia's Foreign Policy

Georgia's nearly 20-year track record of transitioning a failed state into a young and prospective democratic republic has been largely hailed by Western democrats. However, the kremlin regards Tbilisi's pro-Western foreign policy agenda and ambition to participate in the European and Euro-Atlantic cosmos as a huge security danger. The merger of Georgia's transparent and powerful system and Western-style democratic system presents a clear and apparent contrast to russia's authoritarian system, creating an incentive for other governments to follow Georgia's example. (Natia Seskuria, 2021)

vladimir putin, the long-standing president of Russia, has always been treating Georgia as simply the part of russia's sphere of influence in its important region, in the South Caucasus. Because of this so-called influence, russians suggest that it grants leverage over Georgia's foreign policy formation and future steps. putin and his regime in Russia does not want the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be enlarged in Caucasus region and it's neighborhood, as russian officials simply perceives that as the act to weaken Russia and its sphere of influence. Thus, russia is afraid of loosing its domination throughout the region. (Natia Seskuria, 2021)

It therefore comes as no surprise that the kremlin was extremely unhappy with Georgia's slow progress toward democracy and its improving ties with NATO partners, which ultimately led to the use of force by moscow against Tbilisi. The 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, where NATO promised to admit Georgia, as well as Ukraine, to the alliance in the future, came before the 2008 August War. However, due to a lack of agreement among NATO members, Georgia was left without a Membership Action Plan (MAP) that would result in membership and quite simply, without any security assurances. (Kavadze, 2020)

Because of the lack of security assurances, the kremlin was able to proceed with its military attack and make Georgia pay the price for taking a different course than russia had planned. Despite the war's devastating economic and political consequences, the kremlin failed to achieve its long-term ideological and political goal of changing Georgian public attitudes toward russia and disrupting Georgia's quest for Euro-Atlantic integration by characterizing the russian government as the only guarantor of security for a small South Caucasus state. (Gaidai, 2016)

Georgia's membership into the NATO is still very distant, but still tries its best to make Georgia distant from NATO. But, more and more people of Georgia are willing to become the members of European society, and here, the huge role was played by russia's military policy. Especially after 2008, popular support for Georgia's integration in western societies. (Natia Seskuria, 2021)

Despite moscow's desire to be perceived as a "peaceful mediator" and its refusal to be identified due to the presence of russian federal security service (FSB) soldiers on the ground, both seized territories are entirely subject to moscow as a party to the war. Since russia acknowledged the independence of Abkhazia and so-called South Ossetia, the kremlin has endeavored to present them as separate entities, despite the reality that they are inside Georgia's internationally recognized boundaries. This initiative has mostly failed due to worldwide community support for Georgia's non-recognition stance of seized areas, as well as a judgment by the European Court of Human Rights. (Civil. GE, 2022)

Despite the lack of international support, the kremlin has effectively taken advantage of the occupation of Georgia by enacting a "border policy." A new phenomenon in russia's political arsenal, "bordering," is a series of actions by russia to invade Georgian territory. This is a quiet war against Tbilisi, with actions such as barbed wire, border signs, illegal fence installation, and Georgian land confiscation. Consistent human rights abuses continue to divide families and affect the humanitarian situation in the field. Boundary markers were moved to the village of

Tsitelubani in 2015 to enclose part of the Baku-supsa oil pipeline operated by BP. As an additional leverage, kremlin-backed troops routinely kidnapped people. (Natia Seskuria, 2021)

Another solution imposed by russian society is offering is the “Swiss Model” which simply means the military non-intervene in political neutrality. For some reason, the idea can also additionally in a few instances be attractive for normal residents because it appears to endorse a non violent decision of the conflicts thru being an unbiased participant in global relations. In reality, the idea of “neutrality” is but every other myth. Given the modern-day geopolitical state of affairs and russia’s objectives to dominate the South Caucasus, preserving Georgia “neutral” manner depriving it of Western political support, rejecting Georgia’s pro-Western overseas coverage agenda, and returning Georgia to russia’s sphere of influence, subsequently main to the weakening of democracy. (Natia Seskuria, 2021)

The Relationship Between Ukraine and russia in the 21st Century

putin called the collapse of the soviet Union as one of the devastating event or catastrophe that has happened during the 20th century. The president was suggesting russia and its policy as the legitimate country in world’s great powers. Duing his presidency, he spent years for rebuilding the russian army and devoting himself to the power to claim geopolitical influence. (Dan Bilefsky, Richard Pérez-Peña and Eric Nagourney, 2022)

russian president describes the prospect of Ukraine's accession as a major threat, with NATO expansion as a threat. The more confident and military the russians were, the greater their dissatisfaction with NATO. russian president continued to speak about the United States combat forces in Ukraine, despite claims that there are no US, Ukrainian, or NATO officials. East-West relations deteriorated sharply in early 2014, when a large-scale protest in Ukraine expelled the president, who had a close alliance with putin. russia soon invaded and annexed Ukraine's Crimea. moscow also fueled a separatist rebellion that dominated parts of Ukraine's Donbas region, and the war was still ongoing, killing more than 13,000 people. putin seems determined to put the clock back for more than 30 years and establish a broad russian-dominated safe haven, similar to the forces moscow used during the Soviet era. The 69-year-old, who may be the finishing point of his political career, clearly wants to return Ukraine, a country of more than 40 million people, to russia's sphere of influence. (Dan Bilefsky, Richard Pérez-Peña and Eric Nagourney, 2022)

In December, russia submitted NATO and the US with a set of formal conditions indicating that it was essential to maintain its security. For starters, it ensures that Ukraine will not join NATO, that its troops will be withdrawn in Eastern European countries that NATO already has, and that the 2015 ceasefire will take place in Ukraine. (Dan Bilefsky, Richard Pérez-Peña and Eric Nagourney, 2022)

General Overview

The cold war between russia and Ukraine have started way earlier. In the early 1990s, there was widespread support in Ukraine for leaving the soviet union. Massive demonstrations in support of Ukrainian independence took occurred, including a 300,000-strong human chain. From Lviv to Kiev, the chain spanned over 600

kilometers and is thought to have brought together over 1.5 million people in support of Ukrainian freedom. A referendum was held later that year, and over 90% of the population voted in favor of independence. In 1991, Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk was sworn in as the country's first president. He remained in office until 1994.

Ukraine inherited a huge reserve of nuclear weapons following the fall of the Soviet Union. It was considered as the world's third largest, with technology to design and manufacture more weapons. Ukraine decided to destroy the weapons and join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1994. (NPT). The Budapest Memorandum was signed on December 5, 1994, by Ukraine, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Ukraine was guaranteed security assurances in exchange for joining the NPT as a non-nuclear armed state, according to the wording of the pact. (Karina Shyrokykh, 2018)

Between all the nations that border Ukraine, Russian Federation continues to be the crucial neighbor. Ukraine's members of the family with Moscow are the important thing trouble of its overseas coverage to such an volume that every choice of the Ukrainian overseas coverage is first and principal a preference as to the form of its members of the family with Russia. This is especially a result of Ukraine's location and geopolitical situation, the heritage of many centuries of political, financial, and cultural ties between those states, as well as Russia's inherently dominating role as their joint members of the family. (Karina Shyrokykh, 2018)

Furthermore, that is a result of the reality that the European Union's maximum crucial accomplice within the East of Europe is Russia, whilst Ukraine is viewed via way of means of the EU especially within the context of its members of the family with Russia: the higher those members of the family, the higher Ukraine could be perceived via way of means of Berlin, Brussels and particularly Paris. In the case of the USA the state of affairs is a bit different, for the reason that US is inquisitive about the independence of Ukraine's safety coverage from that of Russia, nonetheless the Americans additionally see Ukraine especially within the context in their members of the family with Russia. (Karina Shyrokykh, 2018)

Such an impact, according to Moscow, poses a threat to both its ability to influence the situation in the Balkans and its strategic role within the Black Sea Basin. One must see Russia's desire to maintain its base in Sevastopol, a facility of crucial importance in the Black Sea, in the perspective of this. Moscow no longer needs to balance its political influence in Ukraine with the West since it regards the prospective presence of NATO along the Black Sea's northern shore as a threat to its security. The crucial importance of Ukraine's land as a Russian transit country is linked to this geopolitical challenge. (Huseynov, 2016)

One of the essential aspects of Ukraine is the importance of oil pipelines and fuel going through Ukraine to Western and Central Europe. The same equality has the provision of oil pipelines and product pipelines to the road of the Odesa-Ilichivsk port complex, as well as Russia's capability to export electricity, and the continuity of avenue and rail transit to and from those ports and to and from Ukrainian ports on the Danube. Access to Eastern and, in particular, Southern Europe, as well as Turkey, through Ukrainian territory, is also critical for Russia. (Huseynov, 2016)

It is in Ukraine's best interests to maintain Ukraine's independence and avoid political dependence on Russia for its inevitable political and economic control. This involves modeling the relationship between Ukraine and Russia as an "asymmetric partnership", strengthening Ukraine's position as a subject of self-determination in international relations, and maintaining or expanding the degree of legal separation of Ukraine. Includes doing. Not only is this separation a symbol of sovereignty, but inequality in customs, tax and other regulations is an important source of income for Ukrainian companies. (Coyle, 2018)

To achieve these goals, Ukraine seeks as close cooperation as possible with the United States, especially within the security zone, and all Russian and US agreements consider its security interests. You should be sure to put it in. Families in other European countries are less important given that they may not be willing to counter Russia's impact on Kyiv. Nevertheless, Ukraine has no intention of replacing the US Navy's presence in its territory with the Russian presence, and it seems unlikely that it would significantly tighten naval cooperation with the United States. Kyiv knows how important it is for Ukraine to maintain close family ties with Russia, especially in safe zones. Ukraine's second most important issue is related to Russia's reliance on power components.

The War of 2014: The Case of Crimea

The armed conflict by Russian military forces in the Eastern part of Ukraine started in the year of 2014. (Clarke, 2019) From the starting point till today, over 14,000 people were killed. For over eight years, Ukrainian government forces fought Russian-backed separatists to control much of two highly industrialized areas (also known as Donetsk) in Donetsk and Luhansk. The fierce battle of 2014-2015 ended in one-third of the region's territory and was the most urbanized part, occupied by two Russian agents, the self-proclaimed Donetsk and the People's Republic of Luhansk. Between September 2014 and February 2015, Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany signed several iterations of the so-called Minsk Agreement. This eventually stopped the advance of the army and significantly reduced combat. However, the agreement was never carried out, the battle turned into trench warfare, and about 75,000 soldiers fought each other along more than 400 km front line through densely populated areas. The war ruined the region's economy and heavy industry, migrating millions of people and turning the conflict zone into one of the world's most mining areas. (Conflict in Ukraine's Donbas: A Visual Explainer, n.d.)

Russia established a strategic foothold on the Black Sea by conquering Crimea in 2014. With a stronger and more advanced military presence in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and North Africa, Russia may project power further into areas where it has historically had limited impact. According to some commentators, the West failed to impose substantial consequences on Russia in reaction to its annexation of Crimea, which only enhanced Putin's readiness to employ military force to achieve his foreign policy aims. Russia's strategic advances in the Donbass remained more tenuous until its invasion in 2022. Supporting the separatists had increased its bargaining power with Ukraine, at least temporarily. (Conflict in Ukraine's Donbas: A Visual Explainer, n.d.)

By March, observers from the west had faced unpredictable battlefield retreat, and Moscow narrowed its purpose, as it did in Donbas in 2014, in southern Ukraine like the Kherson region. He said he might try to separate some. Russia might use these newly occupied territories as the card in peace negotiations with Ukraine. This may include provisions regarding the outlook for Kyiv's accession to the EU and NATO. Others have suggested that attacks on Kyiv would be continued and do not believe in all claims made by Moscow to keep aggressive military operations far away from the capital, Kyiv. (CrisisGroup, 2022)

The case of Crimea is quite similar to August war of 2008, as there was only one reason under these two military occupations by Russia: Georgia's and Ukraine's ties with Western power and European Union, especially in the years of 2013 and 2014. Before this war, Ukrainian President Yanukovich was pursuing to become active member of EU and at the same time, quite inevitable, Russia was trying to include Ukraine to join the organization of EAEU, which was even non-existent during that time. In 2013, President Yanukovich, changed its plans to have better relations with European Union, because he was under pressure of Russia. By its end, Russian officials have been trying to have Ukraine as a member state of EAEU, which was not even existed. President chose to remain close ties with Russia, and new wave of protests have started under the name of Euromaidan. (Clarke, 2019)

According to Russian president Putin, the Euromaidan uprising removed Yanukovich from power as a Western-backed "extremist takeover" that imperiled the ethnic Russian majority in Crimea. It was said that Western pioneers excused this as outrageous publicity reminiscent of Soviet times. As a result, Putin sought a clandestine invasion of Crimea, which he subsequently justified as a rescue operation. "Every situation has a tipping point. Furthermore, our Western allies have gone too far in Ukraine" Putin announced in March 2014, formalizing the extension. (CrisisGroup, 2022)

Vladimir Putin also broadly was speaking about the area as Novorossiia or the so-called new Russia, a term tracing back to eighteenth-century magnificent Russia. Furnished Russian provocateurs, including a few specialists of Russian security administrations, are accepted to play had a focal impact in mixing the counter Euromaidan secessionist developments in the district into defiance. Be that as it may, not at all like Crimea, Russia proceeded to formally deny its contribution to the Donbas struggle until it sent off its more extensive intrusion into Ukraine in the year 2022. (Crisisgroup, 2022)

By conquering Crimea in 2014, Russia strengthened its control of the Black Sea's strategic scaffolding. With a larger and stronger military presence, Russia can project its power deeper into the traditionally limited influence of the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and North Africa. Some analysts claim that Western countries have failed to impose large costs on Russia in response to the annexation of Crimea. Until the invasion in 2022, Russia's strategic interests in Donbas were more vulnerable. Supporting separatists, at least temporarily, strengthened bargaining power with Ukraine. (Clarke, 2019)

The crisis in Ukraine since 2013 and its regional, regional, and global impacts show a return to the dynamics of violent national fragmentation that prevailed in the early 1990s. More strategically, Russia is taking advantage of the fierce civil war in so-called near-overseas countries to expand its influence in post-soviet space and at the same time reduce its Western influence. In this regard, conflicts in the Donbas region of Ukraine may foresee a more radical change in Russia's strategic actions and military and security for Russia to manage the regional security complex. As part of its doctrine, it shows how to adopt different tactics of social destabilization and secret occupation, both in its identity and in its ability to maintain its status as a great power and to act globally. It is essential. (CrisisGroup, 2022)

Russian strategy towards Ukraine since late 2013 in this sense likewise shows that real and dormant contentions in Eastern Europe have entered a subjectively new and more perilous stage, regularly depicted as another Cold War yet distant from the domineering soundness that then won in this region of the planet. Albeit generally molded by Moscow, at times for over twenty years, these contentions exist inside a more extensive local and worldwide international setting that isn't dependably or influenced quite a bit by. This outer aspect has gone through extensive movements with the union and fortifying of Russia as a provincial power with a desire to assume a prevailing part in its Near Abroad and then some, and progressively with the tactical capacities and political will to do as such. (Christopher S. Chivvis, n.d.)

After Crimea's war of 2014, it's important to understand what type of relations these countries had after the end of one conflict and before the starting point of the military occupation in 2022. These years are important for analyzing current war, as the events happened these years can be simply considered as the starting point of the 2022 conflict.

The Cold War Between Russia and Ukraine: Years of 2014-2022

Two former republics of the Soviet Union are once again in the conflict due to Russia's military aggression against Ukraine. It's essential to understand what their relations were like during the years from 2014 till 2022, when there was no direct conflict between these countries. And what has changed after 8 years so that Russia has decided to once again directly attack Ukraine.

In the year of 2014, the Protesters in Ukraine overthrow President Viktor Yanukovich in February, one of the major motives for this became that he was pleasant to Russia's interests. During the revolution, extra than a hundred human beings had been killed in protests that targeted on the principle rectangular withinside the capital, Kyiv, frequently known as the Maidan. (Pierre Morcos; Andrew Lohsen, 2022)

Zelensky experienced many phases of popularity over the first part of his presidency. He brought together East and West, urban and rural, wealthy and impoverished Ukraine as the clear winner of the 2019 presidential elections. However, because the majority of Ukrainians believed their nation was headed in the wrong path, his approval ratings significantly declined in January 2021 and January 2022. (Mykhailo Minakov, 2022)

Zelensky had both strengths and shortcomings as president during peacetime, but during the war, he really came into his own. Zelensky has proven to be a tenacious and brave wartime leader who properly satisfies the country's need for strong leadership. He has refused to leave Ukraine, both before and after the start of the Russian invasion, despite multiple requests from foreign leaders. (Mykhailo Minakov, 2022)

Following Ukraine's election of Volodymyr Zelensky as president in 2019, multiple prisoner swaps took place, but ties between Moscow and Kyiv have subsequently deteriorated further. Russia sent about 100,000 troops to the Ukrainian border in the spring of 2021. The Normandy negotiations, which were supposed to execute the so-called Minsk agreements, were gravely harmed in November when Russia's foreign ministry disclosed confidential diplomatic communications with Germany and France. (Mykhailo Minakov, 2022)

The United States and its allies began warning in the same month that Russia may be contemplating another invasion. Moscow offered a package of security recommendations in the form of two treaties, including a demand that Ukraine never join NATO and that the alliance reduce its presence in former Warsaw Pact countries. (Mykhailo Minakov, 2022)

In an attempt to settle the problem, Putin and US President Joe Biden talked twice by phone before the new year, and a series of talks were conducted in January between Russian officials and their counterparts in the US, NATO, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The conflict remains unresolved. (Civil. GE, 2022)

Two Russian military buildups along the Ukrainian border in 2021–2022—one in March and April 2021 and the second from December 2021 to February 2022—foreshadowed an escalation. Additionally, during both of these stages, there were more reports of armed formations preventing the OSCE Missions from entering the conflict area. This indicates that as the invasion approached, it became harder to see what was happening in the Donbas battle zone. The OSCE eventually stated it would remove its Mission on February 24, 2022, the day of the invasion. All of its foreign employees fled Ukraine on March 8. In anticipation of the Mission's rebirth, local Mission personnel will continue in administrative roles, although the OSCE has halted its reporting efforts. (Civil. ge, 2022)

The Russian government's decision to allow the independence of the two separatist republics on February 21, 2022, virtually ended the debate over the implementation of Minsk. Three days later, Russia invaded Ukraine and led a new stage of war with a level of violence far beyond what is depicted here. (Civil. GE, 2022)

On April 2019 there has been a presidential election in Ukraine. A former comedian, Volodymyr Zelensky, became elected via way of means of a big majority as president of Ukraine on a promise to make peace with Russia and repair Donbas to the country. Quite simple, together along with his politics, the Kremlin became now no longer satisfied.

russia's Ongoing Military Aggression Towards Southern-Eastern Regions of Ukraine

The war between Ukraine and russia was inevitable, because the President of Ukraine, Volodimir Zelensky was always speaking about it. This is not even a war between two countries, it's Ukraine defending itself from russian military aggression and occupation. russia released a complete-scale assault from more than one guideline on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, after numerous weeks of constructing up troops at the United State's border. In response, NATO deployed troops to member states inside the location at the same time as tens of heaps of Ukrainians fled the USA and others took up hands towards russian soldiers. As humans took to the streets throughout Russia to protest President vladimir putin's invasion, the EU, US, and allied nations delivered sanctions. (Evgeny Gontmakher, 2022)

The Ukraine president additionally had a telephone call with Italy's high minister, Mario Draghi, and says he harassed the significance of greater sanctions on russia and unblocking Ukrainian ports.

The russian military has made progress in various areas and desires complete control over them. They mostly operate in two areas: the south, primarily in the vicinity of Kherson, a Black Sea port city whose authority is disputed, and Mariupol, on the Sea of Azov. russian soldiers' bombing of these cities had caused major humanitarian concerns, with bridges and highways devastated and limited access to food, clean water, medication, and power in certain regions. Kharkiv, Ukraine's second-largest city, has been hit by russian artillery many times, causing extensive damage to residential areas. (CrisisGroup, 2022)

When the invasion first began in Ukraine, the protests started in russia against its military occupations. That protest's main implication was that 2000 people were arrested by russian police. Overall, almost 4300 protesters were arrested, quite ironically, including children. Also, speaking about russians, it was surprising that even some soldiers sent to Ukraine have been reported to abandon their posts and start helping Ukrainian forces. This was mainly caused because most soldiers didn't know they were going to the war against Ukraine. (CrisisGroup, 2022)

To stop military aggression coming from russia, these two countries were obliged to have diplomatic meetings during the war. russian and Ukrainian officials met in March, where they agreed that there was a need for humanitarian corridors, which simply met the safe zones for the Ukrainian civilians, but as expected, this agreement did not reach a larger ceasefire. For March 6, several attempts to evacuate Ukrainian people have been halted mainly due to russian shelling, as russian officials never keep their word. (CrisisGroup, 2022)

russian president's main attempt is to make changes to the world map, especially speaking about the European map. This attempt has become the most devastating conflict after the World War Second. russia's military aggression has caused a huge humanitarian crisis, thousands of civilian have died and many were obliged to leave their houses and go abroad. As the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees suggests, this crisis made the fastest-growing refugee crisis in the Europe of 21st century.

People frequently retaliate violently in an effort to punish reality when delusions do not match reality. The violence can escalate to unimaginable heights and endanger many lives if the person is a political leader who is not subject to any institutional, legal, or moral restraints on his decisions and acts. The fury and viciousness displayed by russian troops in Mariupol, Bucha, and other Ukrainian locations they hold are most certainly a result of this. And this is unquestionably the reason why Putin refuses to accept any responsibility for the atrocities in Ukraine. (Mykhailo Minakov , 2022)

As putin's war against Ukraine and the international conflict it has spawned develop, both the structural and personality factors involved will be put to the test. The next stages of military action, as well as the economic hardships endured by the Ukrainian people, will put Zelensky's fortitude to the test. putin's abilities will be put to the test by the impending socioeconomic crisis and war losses. There are reasons to believe that the personality factor will become increasingly important in Ukraine, russia, and the world we live in (Mykhailo Minakov , 2022).

Military aggression of russia in Ukraine has started in 2022, February 24, from the early morning. russian president vladimir putin launched the “special military operation” into the Ukraine. This was launched in the country of at least 40 million people. As russian governmental forces suggest, this military aggression is due to “denazification” and for this, russian tries their best to avoid the word “occupation”. There were several important territories of Ukraine which was the main target for russian military forces (Mykhailo Minakov , 2022).

This war is not yet finished. There is no prediction when the war can be stopped, but the whole society believes that Ukraine will be the winner here and with international society, it will show Russia that there is no need for military occupations in the 21st century.

European Financial and Economic Sanctions Against Russia

Since russia recognized non-government controlled enclaves in Ukraine's Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts on February 21, 2022, and the unprovoked and unlawful invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the EU has placed a slew of additional sanctions on russia. They supplement current sanctions placed on russia since 2014 in response to the annexation of Crimea and the failure to implement sanctions. implement the Minsk agreements. These sanctions imposed by the United Nations were in response to the russia'n aggression. EU has adopted five main packages of sanctions that were designed to weaken russia's economic ability in the war. (Council of European Union, 2022)

The EU has issued five packages of sanctions on russia since February, including targeted restrictive measures, including individual sanctions, economic penalties, and diplomatic measures. In reaction to Belarus's role in the invasion of Ukraine, the EU imposed sanctions on the country. The goal of economic sanctions is to punish russia severely for its conduct and effectively oppose russia's ability to continue hostilities. Individual sanctions are levied on those who support, finance, or carry out acts that will weaken or threaten Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence. (Council of European Union, 2022)

Some restrictions for russian citizens consist of travel bans and asset freezes. Travel bans prohibit listed people from entering or leaving EU territory by land, air, or sea. Freezing funds means that all accounts held by designated individuals and groups of EU banks will be frozen. It is also prohibited to provide money or goods directly or indirectly. This ensures that their money can no longer be used to support the russian government and they cannot try to find a haven in the EU. In total, the EU has sanctioned 80 entities and 1093 individuals, taking into account previous personal sanctions imposed after the 2014 Crimean annexation. These include russian president vladimir putin russian Foreign Minister sergey lavrov kremlin-roman abramovic; the russian House of Representatives who voted to approve Donetsk and Luhansk on February 15, 2022. Members of the relevant oligarch army, such as members, prominent businessmen (ie, individuals involved in the russian steel industry, and other people who provide financial services, military products, and technology to the russian state), advertisers or actors of disinformation selected relatives of some of the above persons. (Council of European Union, 2022)

As part of economic sanctions, the EU imposes russia many import and export limitations. This implies that European firms cannot sell some items to russia, due to its export restrictions, and russian companies cannot sell certain products to the EU. The list of prohibited goods is intended to maximize the detrimental impact of sanctions on the russian economy while minimizing the impact on EU enterprises and persons. Import and export restrictions prohibit items principally meant for human consumption, as well as products connected to health, medicine, nutrition, and agriculture so that the population is not harmed. russia. EU Customs authorities implement the restriction. (KPMG, 2022)

Furthermore, the EU passed a declaration, in concert with other like-minded partners, reserving the ability to revoke russia's position as a WTO most favored nation. The EU has determined to handle this issue through a number of restrictive measures, including limitations on certain products' import or export. The EU and its partners have also paused all work on Belarus' WTO accession. (Anneken Tappe, 2022)

SWIFT is a messaging service that works on facilitating the exchange of some type of information between banks and quite simply, between financial institutions. This organization has over 11 000 entities throughout the world. Without it, its almost impossible to obtain foreign currency, even abroad. For sure, banks can do that operations without SWIFT, but it is more difficult and simply needs many steps. russia, as the part of sanctions, was banned from SWIFT.

These sanctions imposed by international system is for stopping russia from its aggressive politics. As we can see, the sanctions are working really well, and it will continue to have a huge impact on russia's society. This will weaken russia and of course, will affects on its ability during the russo-Ukrainian war.

How russia Affects Foreign Policy of Georgia and Ukraine

Georgia and Ukraine can be considered as the countries that share the same history, especially during the era of the soviet union; new dimensions in international political system and most importantly, the desire to become a full-fledge member

state of western community. Quite simple, they do share the same foreign policy strategy, due to their shared enemy, russia, who always try to be a part of their internal and external policy formation. In this chapter, we are going to discuss how russia affects the foreign policy of Georgia and Ukraine and what threat these countries are facing from russia. (Natia Seskuria, 2021)

The transformation of international relations, the end of conflict, the steady elimination of the consequences of the "Cold War", and the progress of russia's reforms have greatly expanded opportunities for cooperation on the world stage. The risk of a global nuclear war is minimized. Military power remains important in interstate relations, but economic, political, scientific, technical, environmental, and informative factors play an increasingly important role. The main components of the state power of the russian federation are its intellectual, information, and communication skills, the level of national wealth and education, the degree of combination of scientific and productive resources, and the financial capital of centralized economic relations. Diversification. It will come out to the front. The overwhelming majority of states are enthusiastic about economic management and the pursuit of democratic and worthless market methods. Significant progress in many important areas of scientific and technological progress has led to the formation of a unified world information environment and the deepening and diversification of international economic relations, making national interdependence a global character. Preconditions are created to build a more stable, crisis-resistant world structure. (nukes.fas, 2000)

At the same time, new challenges and threats to russia's national interests are emerging at the international level. Benefiting from the US economy and power, there is a growing tendency to establish a unipolar world structure. Reliance on the limited composition of Western institutions and forums has weakened the role of the UN Security Council in resolving basic international security issues. (nukes. fas, 2000)

One-sided action strategies can destabilize international affairs, create tensions and arms races, and exacerbate interstate contradictions, national and religious conflicts. The use of power methods that bypass existing international legal mechanisms cannot resolve the deep socio-economic, ethnic and other contradictions underlying conflict and only undermine the foundations of law and order is.

russia's Influence on International Political System

At first glance, moscow's tries to create an internet of relationships and assignment impact in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and different elements of the sector appear like a new detail of russian overseas coverage. However, that end could be mistaken. russian overseas coverage has been constructing as much as its gift expansive section for over decades. Moreover, its targets have a wholelot deeper roots. Continuity with the Soviet technology or even in advance intervals of russian records is an indicator of the Kremlin's cutting-edge overseas coverage and the toolkit it is based directly to develop its goals. It is consequently important to study the overseas coverage legacy of the soviet union. Core additives of the cutting-edge

russian toolkit have withstood the check of time, and there may be each indication that moscow will hold to rely upon them, even in a post-putin technology.

Modern russian foreign policy reveals the unmistakable presence of a three-century-old driver of the moscow location on the world stage. The most important of this impetus is the quest for russia's strategic depth and safe buffering against external threats, given that there are no natural protection barriers between the geography of the country and neighboring powers. And led to its geographical expansion. In addition to physical unrest and expansion, the second major impetus for russia's foreign policy is the quest for recognition of the great powers, and the kremlin is needed to justify its geographical conquest and geopolitical ambitions. I've been thinking for a long time. The third impetus associated with the first two is the complex relationship between russia and the West, which combines the need for competition and cooperation. (Christopher S. Chivvis, n.d.)

As changed into the case at some stage in the Cold War, russian coverage in the direction of the West has lengthy had a crucial ideological dimension. During the Soviet era, the ideological opposition changed into Soviet communism and democratic capitalism. After an exceedingly quick duration, whilst russia tried to sign up for the West, moscow has embraced a brazenly anti-Western ideology. communism has been changed with the aid of using a mixture of nationalist, authoritarian, and state-capitalist thoughts as an opportunity for the West's belief in liberal democratic capitalism. The idea of russia as a besieged castle going through opposing Western designs and effects is a key device the regime makes use of to mobilize the political assistance of russian elites and normal residents alike.

The Role of russia in Ukraine's Foreign Policy Formation

Ukraine's foreign policy is a strategic approach adopted by Ukraine regarding foreign relations, cooperation with international organizations, promotion of national interests, and protection of the rights of foreign citizens and diasporas. The strategic goals of Ukraine's foreign policy include the integration of Europe and the Euro-Atlantic, the formation of strategic partnerships between the United States and the European Union, cooperation between CIS and GUAM member states, active involvement with the United Nations, and others. International organizations, being an active and effective participant in the global economy while protecting their national interests, and the transformation of Ukraine into a regional power. (Gaidai, 2016)

Ukraine's foreign policy is guided by several important priorities. European integration is an important priority that brings together the full scope of Ukraine's internal and external policy efforts to approach the European Union and create the necessary conditions for future EU accession. An integral part of Ukraine's European Integration Course was the provision of diplomatic support to complete Ukraine's accession to the WTO on 16 May 2008. After joining the WTO in 2006, Ukraine was proposed to proceed to the first stage of integration with the EU, the creation of a free trade area (which also does not exist in the CIS). Currently, the status of the dialogue on cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union is based on the implementation of strategies specially developed for the integration of the EU into

the Ukrainian economy and the phased implementation of the European Policy Action Plan. These measures include most economic and social reforms, primarily to get closer to Europe. (Gaidai, 2016)

Ukraine is already in active cooperation in international organizations, such as European Union and NATO or North Atlantic Treaty Organization. With EU, Ukraine is in cooperation in some of the main aspects: security, financial institutions, foreign trade and more than that. The case of NATO-Ukraine is different, as its mainly stressed on the protection of Ukraine's security interests and are working on the gradual integration in NATO. This future integration is mainly outlined via two documents that are essential for Ukraines future foreign policy: the Action Plan and the Annual Goal Plan starting from 2005.

In the year of 2014, on July 30, the United States Senate issued a bill giving three countries, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, the status of non-NATO allies. Quite simply, it meant that in case of direct military aggression coming from Russia or any other country, the United States could bring troops and help these countries during military occupations or another type of external aggression. (Civil. GE, 2022)

As part of its international political goals, Ukraine tries its best to use the full potential of the strategic partnership based on mutual interest and common approaches to the development of relations with the United States, russia, and Poland; to achieve and maintain good relations with neighboring countries in an atmosphere of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. But as it seems, it is really difficult for post-Soviet countries to stop Russia from its military aggression. Ukraine will achieve its goal of promoting European values in the region, in particular through active participation in resolving frozen conflicts. This should sum up its foreign policy as a beneficiary one. (Christopher S. Chivvis, n.d.)

Ukraine pursues an active multilateral policy within the framework of universal and regional international organizations. Participation in the UN is aimed primarily at advancing Ukraine's interests in the process of making the most important decisions for the entire world community. Activities within the OSCE will remain an important factor in complementing and enhancing regional and overall stability and security in Europe. (Civil. GE, 2022)

Ukrainian officers expressed frustration approximately the reality that in the Nineteen Nineties and 2000s, Western nations led overseas coverage biased in the direction of russia, orientated to account for moscow's hobbies, and primarily based totally on moscow's reassets of statistics, to the detriment of different post-soviet nations. Western political elites no longer have a clear knowledge of Ukraine's history, its country-wide traditions, the demanding situations of growing its democracy and transitioning to a marketplace economy, or the significance and fine position of nationalistic movements. As an example, German diplomats informed their Ukrainian opposite numbers in 1994 that russia changed into Germany's maximum crucial associate in Eastern Europe. Ukrainian leaders had been frequently portrayed as unreliable and corrupt leaders. (Ecaterina Locoman, 2022)

Now, the arena has rallied overwhelmingly in aid of Ukraine because it fights to counter russia's aggression, even though it is unlucky that this shift in mind-set is

going on amidst the tragedy of battle and on the price of Ukrainian lives. The remarkable monetary sanctions, the various organizations taking flight from Russia, and the political, monetary, and navy help Ukraine has acquired from the collective West all are symptoms and symptoms that Ukraine is triumphing the statistics battle and that Russia's narratives are being challenged. Still, the legacies of getting a Russia-focused coverage are posing demanding situations to a few nations within the West (substantially Germany) on the subject of implementing harsher sanctions on Russia and reducing their electricity dependency on Russia. (Ecaterina Locoman, 2022)

Essential Factor Affecting Georgia's Integrations in International Political System

All significant political parties in Georgia have agreed, for more than 20 years, on the concept of Western integration. There haven't been many significant overtly pro-Russian parties. Georgia's dedication to pro-Western policies was one of the few topics that garnered bipartisan agreement, despite the exceptionally strained relations between the government and the opposition following the transfer of power in October 2012. 4 Public opinion polls consistently show a high level of support for the integration of the EU and NATO: normally, more than 70% support Euro-Atlantic integration with less than 10% against. (Kakachia & Cecire, *Georgian Foreign Policy: The Quest for Sustainable Security*, 2013)

In recent years Georgia has dramatically transformed itself and has begun to move towards integration. Political institution of choice for the future of Europe has played an important role. Despite his Problems, the country's path toward democracy, and the integration into the European structure is clear. The parliamentary elections last October were held without delay. The transfer of power in Georgia, but in a sense the success of the EU's democratic agenda in the Eastern Partnership. Economic Political stable Georgia can be seen in the long run Potential to be a successful Eastern European country Development model that other post-Soviet countries cannot. But think of Georgia as the front line of the region When it comes to European integration, we still have to be the top candidates. Take a coherent approach to solving the current problem Drive democratic change. (Kakachia, *Georgia: identity, foreign policy and the politics*, 2013)

Over time because it regained its independence, the small, vulnerable nation of Georgia has confronted extreme home and worldwide issues that have threatened its life as a sovereign nation. Inheriting a political culture missing a robust democratic tradition, an inexperienced overseas coverage elite, scarce economic sources, and poorly described competing social forces, first of all, Georgia was not able to increase a feasible overseas and protection coverage toward the out-of-doors world. The United States's fragility became examined through regular Russian tries to undermine and control it, which constituted the best mission for its country-wide protection. Consequently, playing because it did huge Western support, Georgia's post-Soviet management felt that the United States had to be engaged in an unfolding sample of alliances regarding nearby and extra-nearby powers. (Kavadze, 2020)

Similarly, Tbilisi's preliminary overseas coverage became pushed through tries to best friend Georgia with other outside powers, main it from a well-known balancing coverage of checking russia to an extra precise bandwagoning coverage of becoming a member of the West and looking for the direct patronage of the U.S. To ensure its protection, it's extensively believed that Georgia ought to take extreme steps to decorate its unconsolidated democracy, constructing the reforms it has already achieved. To increase its hit transformation, Georgia wishes to convey the nation towards a balanced political gadget, with extra electricity dwelling with parliament and an extra vibrant, practical gadget of tests and balances. The peaceful switch of electricity following Georgia's October 1st, 2012 parliamentary elections displays definitely at the US's institutions because it is no longer skilled in this sort of political improvement because of its independence. However, it offers no purpose to anticipate that unexpected democratic breakthroughs or abrupt modifications in economic, social, or diplomatic coverage are likely. (Kavadze, 2020)

Georgia may be able to identify with a variety of areas due to its extensive historical experience and shared cultural customs with other states and regions. These include the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the post-Soviet space. Georgia might have also chosen to pick more than one vector. However, Georgia chose to ignore all of these possibilities and concentrate on its European identity, which eventually formed in the political discourse that developed throughout the nation's turbulent history and ongoing struggle for survival among numerous empires. Euro-Atlantic integration, which has been a cornerstone of the nation's foreign policy for almost 20 years, is also facilitated by European identity. (Kakachia & Minesashvili, Identity politics: Exploring Georgian foreign policy behavior, 2015).

Conclusion

Past several years, the international political system has witnessed the re-emergence of russia as one of the essential global actors. This is due to its aggressive policy towards neighboring countries. United States and Western powers simply act to weaken russia and its threat to international security.

russia always had an aggressive policy towards its neighboring states, especially with those that were part of ussr and after the dissolution, they gained full independence. This policy towards post-Soviet and Middle Eastern countries can be explained by two theoretical understandings, mainly realistic and constructivist.

Records of russia's military and aggressive policy in its neighboring space, especially in the post-Soviet countries are mixed. Indeed, russia's highly modernized army can cover a wide range of missions and exert political pressure through demonstrations of power. On the other hand, moscow's attempt to build unilateral dependencies gained by military cooperation has proven to be only partially feasible. As in the political and economic arena, in the military arena, it is clear that russia's desire for an influential region is at odds with the reality of an increasingly differentiated space. Intervention in Ukraine has strengthened this trend. This is because even russia's former close allies in the CSTO military alliance are now more and more skeptical about cooperating with its larger neighbors. (Klein, 2019)

Reviewing russian interventions in its close to overseas it seems that russian interventions had been reactive selections many outcomes of which can not be understood as superb from a rational actor perspective. The russian help for separatism in so-called South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Ukraine, and the annexation of Crimea, do now no longer yield superb outcomes for the russian pastimes from a rational actor perspective. The behavior of russia in the post-soviet state is often guided with the aid of using safety issues and neo-realist understandings while the russian interventions inside the Post-soviet Space appear to be guided with the aid of using its imperial historical enjoy which bestows upon the russian geopolitical pastimes a self-described layer of ethical responsibility and combines it with both altruism or expansionism or with each on the identical time.

Like other countries, russia has pursued the national interests of its neighbors. But, to some extent, interest was determined by russia's geopolitical vision. It has emerged, at least in part, from the history of her empire, the situation in the world, and the perception of foreign threats. russia's image in the West still suffers from the Cold War and is often said to be offensive and expansionist, but it takes a more reactive and defensive position. It responded to the enlargement of NATO and the EU in its (former) geopolitical sphere of influence, which was seen as a threat to its invasion and its security.

russia has played a long game by deepening its polarization, fostering violence, and creating social divisions. Despite overwhelming support for Georgia's pro-Western foreign policy, russia seeks to portray Tbilisi as a developing country by supporting groups that have organized violent incidents such as July 5 and 6. is. An integral part of the modern and democratic western part. At the same time, the kremlin is undermining Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity by actively pursuing its "border policy." (Natia Seskuria, 2021)

With the existence of populist U.S. former President Donald J. Trump's words that America First is slogan, the U.S. readiness to lead a more robust international order has diminished. Joe Biden, the current president of the United States, has worked to improve American status internationally and undo many of his predecessor's initiatives. But he does so at a time when it's debatable if America still has the lone global superpower position. The globe will be impacted by how it handles its domestic political problems (Menzel, 2022).

Building better societal resilience to counter russia's hybrid tactics will take time and a collective effort. Western backing is critical in countering the kremlin's arsenal of tactics aimed at undoing Georgia's democracy development. Even after more than 10 years after the conflict, Georgian experience demonstrates that the kremlin maintains its tough strategy without paying a high price. Imposing a red line by keeping russia accountable and hastening Georgia's entrance to NATO will provide more stability to the whole Black Sea area, not just Tbilisi. As a result, Georgia should not be regarded as an isolated occurrence. The achievement of democratization and Westernization in Georgia is defined by the triumph of Western values over traditional ones, which are authoritarian and thief political regimes. (Seskuria, 2022).

Suggesting future steps of russia will be difficult as it continues to be the aggressive state with a desire to re-unite post-soviet states under its sphere of influence. In any case, it can be foreseen that russia will continue to be a definitive world power after vladimir putin's resignation. Finally, geopolitical norms and visions are not entirely dependent on people, but historically rooted perceptions, experiences, insights gained, and images that have grown over time. Often depends on.

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